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Abstract
In markets for credence goods sellers are better informed than their
customers about the quality that yields the highest surplus from trade.
This paper studies second-degree price-discrimination in such markets.
It shows that discrimination regards the amount of advice offered to
customers and that it leads to a different distortion depending on the
main source of heterogeneity among consumers. If the heterogeneity is
mainly in the expected cost of efficient service, the distortion involves
overprovision of quality. By contrast, if consumers differ mainly in
the surplus generated whenever the consumer’s needs are met, the
inefficiency involves underprovision of quality.
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1 Introduction
A core characteristic of credence goods is that an expert seller is better in-
formed than her customer about the quality that fits the customer’s needs
best. Important examples are technically advanced goods like IT equipment
and complex production machinery, financial products like insurance poli-
cies and investment portfolios, health care and repair services, as well as
taxi rides in an unknown city. In all these cases, the typical consumer lacks
the expertise to identify the type or quality of the good that fits his needs
best, while an expert seller has the ability to diagnose the customer, thereby
discovering the customer’s needs. The expert can then reveal this informa-
tion and recommend the appropriate quality, or she can abstain from giving
advice. In the latter case the customer might end up with too low or too
high quality. Inefficient underprovision of quality comes at a high cost to
the consumer and to society at large since scarce resources are spent with-
out generating a compensating benefit. Similarly, overprovision is wasteful
because the additional benefits to the customer from the excessive quality
are less than the additional costs. Starting with the seminal contribution
by Darby and Karni (1973), the search for institutions and conditions that
help to contain the efficiency losses on markets for credence goods has been
a central topic in the literature – see Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for
an overview of the theoretical literature, Dulleck et al. (2011) and Huck et
al. (2012) for lab experiments, and Schneider (2012) and Beck et al. (2013)
for field experiments on the effects of informational, institutional and market
conditions on the behavior of customers and sellers in markets for credence
and experience goods.
In this article we investigate the impact of second-degree price-discrimination
on a market for credence goods characterized by market power on the supply
side and heterogeneity of consumers on the demand side. We show that price-
discrimination proceeds along the dimension of amount of advice offered by
the expert. The expert offers the whole quality spectrum and advice on
which quality fits best to a non-trivial segment of the market only and she
offers no advice and only a limited quality range to the rest of the market.
Interestingly, the quality range offered without advice – and therewith the
equilibrium distortion on the market – depends on the main source of hetero-
geneity among consumers. If the heterogeneity is mainly in the expected cost
needed to generate consumer surplus, the distortion involves overprovision
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of quality. By contrast, if consumers differ mainly in the surplus generated
whenever the consumer’s needs are met, the inefficiency involves underprovi-
sion of quality. We explore the conditions under which over- and underpro-
vision of quality occur in equilibrium and discuss the welfare implications of
price-discrimination.
In our theoretical model price-discrimination is implemented by a monopo-
listic expert via posted ’tariffs’.1 At the outset, the expert posts a menu of
tariffs. Each tariff specifies a list of prices – one price for each quality. We
show that in equilibrium the expert always posts an ’efficient-service tariff’
under which she commits to sell the whole spectrum of qualities and to give
advice on which quality fits the consumer’s needs best. In addition, she may
also offer different ’no-advice tariffs’. Through the latter type of tariff only
a limited range of qualities is available and no advice is given. Consumers
observe the menu and decide under which tariff they wish to be served, know-
ing that the expert’s behavior crucially depends on the type of tariff they
choose. Later we argue that in realty second-degree price-discrimination on
markets for credence goods can be implemented by manufacturers with mar-
ket power through the choice of distribution channels. In this interpretation
the efficient-service tariff corresponds to selling the whole quality spectrum
through experts providing advice on which quality fits best; and a no-advice
tariff corresponds to selling a limited quality range through discounters of-
fering the good without advice.
For which sectors are our considerations relevant? A prime example of a
credence goods industry where manufacturers have market power and where
customers are heterogeneous is the IT industry. In this industry customers
(often firms) differ according to their intended use of IT – especially the
probability of needing high capacity (capacity is probably the most impor-
tant quality dimension in the IT industry), as well as the benefit they derive
from sufficient equipment. Insufficient equipment causes high costs because
important tasks cannot be performed; and excess quality is a waste of re-
1Here the important property is not that a single expert serves consumers, but rather
that experts have some degree of market power. In a model in which capacity is required
to serve customers (as in Emons 1997 and 2001, or Richardson 1999) experts have market
power (independently of the number of sellers competing for customers) whenever tight
capacity constraints hamper competition. Similarly, consumer loyalty, travel costs together
with location, search costs, collusion and many other factors may give rise to market power.
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sources because of its high capital cost.2 Users (ordinary households, firms,
non-profit organizations) can procure IT equipment through two channels.
The ’expert channel’ provides the whole spectrum of qualities as well as ad-
vice on which quality fits best. The latter is referred to in the industry
as ’rightsizing advice’ and it is provided either by trained sales agents or
through hired consultants.3 Rightsizing advice ensures that the equipment
satisfies the user’s needs at minimal cost – see Day and Day (2003) for de-
tails. The ’discount channel’ offers a limited selection of equipment without
offering rightsizing advice – customers have to make their capacity decision
themselves. The history of the IT sector reveals that large producers of
equipment employed both channels, but over time the characteristics of the
discount channel changed.
Two particularly well documented cases are IBM and Dell, both major
players on the IT market. In the 1980s, IBM was offering high-powered
mainframe-based integrated systems as well as low-powered PC-based sys-
tems through well-trained sales personnel.4 In addition, low-powered equip-
ment was also offered through a discount channel consisting of no-frills com-
puter warehouses such as Computerland. Today Dell is a major player in the
IT market with a market share consistently above 15% over the last years.
Less known than its discount channel, Dell’s expert channel serves companies
and institutions such as DuPont, CoreLogic, and NIAID, designing, imple-
menting, and optimizing IT services (Dell, 2012). While business clients using
the well-known internet based discount channel usually receive high-capacity
equipment (see Day and Day 2003, who document the resulting oversizing),
the expert channel provides rightsizing advise. An interesting observation
is that the discrimination strategy in the 1980s involved a discount channel
selling low-capacity equipment while today firms sell through the discount
channel equipment with a relatively high capacity while at the same time still
using an expert channel. Such a pattern is predicted by our model for an
industry where the heterogeneity is initially mainly in the surplus generated
2The IT capacity decision is a textbook example in the management literature – see
Hill and Jones (2004, p. 474-479) and Brady et al. (2001, p. 26-30), the latter discussing
the parameters affecting the optimal size of a SAP system.
3A major player in the consultancy market is Accenture. A description of their services
can be found in Accenture (2013).
4Mendelson and Korin (2007) in their history of the computer industry point out that
firms like IBM, NCR, NEC and Wang competed in vertically integrated solutions and the
advice in rightsizing the equipment and implementing the system.
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if the good delivers and later mainly in the expected cost needed to generate
consumer surplus.
The present paper is related to several strands of previous literature. First
and most importantly it is related to the literature on credence goods (or
expert services). The pioneering paper here is Darby and Karni (1973), a
summary of the earlier theoretical literature is provided by Dulleck and Ker-
schbamer (2006). An important difference to most contributions to this liter-
ature is that they investigate models with homogeneous consumers while an
important feature of our model is that consumers are heterogeneous. There
are a few exceptions – two early ones are Darby and Karni (1973) and Pitchik
and Schotter (1993). In both papers, heterogeneity is only used to purify a
mixed strategy equilibrium, however. A third contribution with heteroge-
neous consumers is Richardson (1999) which shares with us the feature that
overprovision of quality may occur in equilibrium. However, in contrast to
the model considered here, Richardson’s findings result from a lack of power
to pre-commit to the prices of high-quality goods and not from the expert’s
desire to induce self selection among consumers. The closest paper to ours re-
garding research question and modeling assumptions is probably Fong (2005),
who assumes identifiable heterogeneity of customers and shows that a mixed
strategy involving overprovision may be used in equilibrium to discriminate
among customers in a setting where the expert cannot explicitly discrimi-
nate. An important difference to our model is that self-selection is not an
issue in Fong’s model with identifiable heterogeneity, while it drives the core
results in the present paper with unobservable characteristics.
Other credence goods papers analyze substantially different settings. Emons
(1997 and 2001) share with us the feature that the quality provided by the ex-
pert is verifiable for the customer and study the incentives of experts for over-
and underprovision of quality to ex ante homogeneous consumers. Emons
finds that whether the market mechanism induces efficient service depends
on the amount of information consumers have at hand to infer experts’ in-
centives.5 Alger and Salanie´ (2006) study a homogeneous-consumer model
in which the degree of verifiability of quality is a continuous variable. They
identify an equilibrium in which experts keep customers uninformed, as this
deters them from seeking a better price elsewhere. Pitchik and Schotter
5That customers’ information plays a crucial role for efficient service in markets for
credence goods is confirmed in a recent field experiment by Beck et al. (2013).
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(1987 and 1993), Wolinsky (1993 and 1995) and Taylor (1995) assume that
the quality of the good is not verifiable and analyze expert’s temptation to
overcharge homogeneous customers.6 Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2003) in-
vestigate a model where effort is needed to diagnose a consumer and where an
expert’s effort investment is unobservable. Their contribution focuses on the
effect an additional diagnosis (by a different expert) has on the consumer’s
evaluation of a given expert’s effort. Liu (2011) extends the model of Fong
to allow for conscientious experts, and Beck et al. (2013) investigate the
impact of guilt aversion on the provision and charging behavior of experts.
Fong and Xu (2012) and Daughety and Reinganum (2013) consider signaling
games where the expert learns the value of her service to the potential client
before offering a contract.
Outside the credence goods literature, our results have close analogies in the
literature on monopolistic screening. In a model in which consumers with
different tastes for quality have unit demand for a good, Mussa and Rosen
(1978) show that a monopolist who only knows the aggregate distribution
of tastes will in general offer a menu of price-quality combinations. As com-
pared to the first-best outcome, (i) the monopolist tends to enlarge the range
of qualities offered, and (ii) almost all consumers buy lower quality products
than would be socially optimal. Similar results have been obtained by Maskin
and Riley (1984) and Besanko et al. (1987), among others. There are several
differences between our work and the models and results in this strand of
literature. The most important one regards the good under consideration.
While there is a natural order in the quality-space in the models investigated
in the monopolistic screening literature, there is only a partial order in this
dimension in the credence goods setting considered here. In particular, high
quality in the Mussa and Rosen model unambiguously corresponds to the
efficient-service solution in the setting considered here. The unusual feature
in the case of credence goods is that there are different (unordered) lower
quality levels. As discussed above, depending on whether consumer hetero-
geneity is mainly in the expected cost needed to generate consumer surplus
or in the surplus generated whenever the consumer’s needs are met, either
6In theory the presence or absence of verifiability is crucial for efficiency on markets for
credence goods – see Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2006) for details. Recent experimental
evidence by Dulleck et al. (2011) indicates that in the lab it plays at best a minor role.
Kerschbamer et al. (2013) explain the discrepancy between theory and lab experiments
by experts having non-trivial distributional preferences.
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a contract that involves underprovision or a contract that involves overpro-
vision is used as a screening device. Another difference to the Mussa and
Rosen model and to many other models studied in the monopolistic screen-
ing literature is that better service (higher quality in the Mussa and Rosen
model; advice and efficient service in our model) is not costly in our model.7
As Acharyya (1998) has shown, Mussa and Rosen’s results heavily depend
on the assumption that improving service quality involves a cost. In par-
ticular, if an improvement is not costly, the monopolist will offer only one
quality – the best available one – as her optimal policy and the only source
of inefficiency that remains is the familiar monopoly pricing distortion. Only
for the case of multiple demand Gabszewicz and Wauthy (2002) show that
quality discrimination may take place even if provision of quality involves no
cost of any sort. As we will see below, consumers can have unit demand and
diagnosis can be costless in the case of credence goods, and still the expert
may refrain from providing advice to some customer groups.
The next section introduces the model and Section 3 studies the benchmark
case without price-discrimination. Section 4 explores the effects of price-
discrimination, first for heterogeneity in the expected cost of efficient ser-
vice, and then for heterogeneity in the value derived from receiving sufficient
quality. Section 5 discusses the world where consumers differ in both dimen-
sions. Section 6 revisits several of our modeling assumptions and discusses
alternatives. In this section we also re-interpret the different tariffs offered
in the single-expert model as different distribution channels chosen by a mo-
nopolistic manufacturer. Section 7 concludes. All proofs can be found in the
appendix.
2 A Credence Goods Model with Heteroge-
neous Consumers
On the demand side of the market there is a continuum with mass one of
risk-neutral consumers. Each consumer (he) needs either a low-quality good,
7The rationale for assuming zero diagnosis cost is that, if the expert finds it profitable
to refrain from providing diagnosis to some consumers when diagnosis costs are zero, then,
a forteriori, she will do so with positive diagnosis costs.
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Customer’s utility Customer gets
c1 c2 no
Customer c1 v
s vs 0
needs c2 xv
s vs 0
Table 1: Utility from a Credence Good
c1, or a high-quality good, c2.
8 The customer knows that he has a need, but
he does not know which quality is sufficient to satisfy it. He only knows
that he has an ex ante probability of t that only high quality is sufficient to
satisfy his need and a probability of (1− t) that the low quality is sufficient.
The consumer gets utility vs from the good when it does deliver, and he
gets xvs < vs, with 0 ≤ x < 1, if it fails to deliver.9 To make sure that
it is efficient to satisfy the need of the consumer, the variable x has to be
sufficiently low such that
(1− x)vs > c2 − c1. (1)
Failure is observable but not verifiable. This means that payments cannot
be conditioned on success. However, quality is observable and verifiable so
that payments can be conditioned on the quality provided.
On the supply side of the market there is a single risk-neutral expert (she).
This expert is able to discover the quality a consumer needs by performing a
costless diagnosis.10 She can then recommend the appropriate or the wrong
quality. The cost of the high-quality good is c2 and the cost of the low-quality
good is c1, with c2 > c1. For convenience, both the quality of the good and
the associated cost is denoted by ci.
Consumers are heterogeneous. In Section 4 we consider two sources of hetero-
geneity. First we assume that consumers differ only in the ex ante probability
of needing the high-quality good, t, but receive the same gross valuation if
8An earlier version of this paper has investigated a model that allows for more than
two types of needs and more than two qualities of the good. The results – available upon
request – are qualitatively the same as in the simpler environment considered here.
9If a user needs a high-capacity PC and receives only a low-capacity one, he is still able
to use it for some purposes.
10We discuss the case where the expert has to invest effort in diagnosis to detect the
need of a consumer in Section 6.
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the good does deliver, vs. Each consumer is then characterized by his type t.
Consumers’ types are drawn independently from the same log-concave c.d.f.
F (·), with strictly positive density f (·) on [0, 1].11 F (·) is common knowl-
edge, but a consumer’s type is the consumer’s private information. Next, we
analyze a model where consumers differ only in their gross valuation if the
good does deliver, vs, but have the same ex ante probability of needing the
high-quality good, t. In this case each consumer is characterized by his type s
and a consumer of type s receives a valuation vs = v− s if the good does de-
liver. Consumers’ types are drawn independently from the same log-concave
c.d.f. G (·), with strictly positive density g (·) on [0, s] . Again, G (·) is as-
sumed to be common knowledge, but a consumer’s type is the consumer’s
private information. In Section 5 we discuss a world where consumers differ
in both dimensions and present our results for that case.
Each consumer incurs a sunk cost c if he visits the expert independently
of whether or not he chooses to be served. This cost represents the time
and effort incurred by the consumer in visiting the seller. Consumers are
maximizers of expected utility. The utility of a consumer if the good does
deliver (does not deliver, respectively) is his gross valuation vs (is x times
vs, respectively) minus the price paid for the good minus the sunk cost c.
The utility of a consumer who has not been served is his reservation payoff,
which we normalize to zero (see Table 1), and the utility of a consumer who
has visited the expert but has decided not to buy the good is -c. The expert
maximizes expected profit. The expert’s profit is the sum of revenues minus
costs over the customers she served.
The interaction between consumers and the expert is sketched in Figure 1
for the special case where the monopolistic expert courts a single consumer
whose type is known with certainty. At the outset, the expert posts take-
it-or-leave-it tariffs. Each tariff specifies the prices p1 and p2 for c1 and c2,
respectively. In the special case covered by the figure, the expert posts a
single tariff only, in the model she might post arbitrary many tariffs. The
consumer observes the tariffs and then decides whether, and if yes, under
which tariff he wants to be served. If he decides for service, a random move
by nature determines his need. Now the expert learns the customer’s need
and then recommends either the low-quality or the high-quality good. Next,
11By log-concavity we mean that F (·) /f (·) is a non-decreasing function. This assump-
tion is not crucial for our analysis, but simplifies the proofs.
8
Figure 1: Game Tree for the Basic Model (t = t for all consumers).
the consumer decides whether to accept or reject the recommendation. If the
consumer accepts, the expert provides the recommended quality and charges
the price posted for it. The game ends with payoffs determined in the obvious
way. The extensive form for our model with a continuum of heterogeneous
consumers and with a menu of tariffs can be constructed from this game tree
in the usual way.
Throughout, we restrict attention to situations where the following two con-
ditions hold
vs − c > c2, (2)
c ≥ (1− t)(c2 − c1), (3)
where condition (2) is assumed to hold for any realization of s and condition
(3) for any realization of t. Condition (2) says that it is efficient to satisfy
each of the two needs. Condition (3) entails that the expert and the consumer
are in effect tied together once the diagnosis has been made. Relaxing this
latter restriction complicates the analysis without generating qualitatively
different results (provided c > 0).12
12See Section 6 for a discussion.
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Before starting with the formal analysis it is important to notice that a tariff
(p1, p2) determines the relative profitability of selling the two qualities for the
expert. Three classes of tariffs are to be distinguished, tariffs that contain
a higher mark-up for the high-quality good (p2 − c2 > p1 − c1), tariffs that
have a higher mark-up for the low-quality good (p2 − c2 < p1 − c1), and
tariffs with equal mark-ups (p2 − c2 = p1 − c1). We denote tariffs in the
first class by ∆2, tariffs in the second by ∆1, and tariffs in the third class
by ∆12, and we will sometimes refer to tariffs in the third class as ’equal-
mark-up’ tariffs. It is clear that the expert has an incentive to always sell
the low-quality good under a ∆1 contract and that she has an incentive to
always sell the high-quality good under a ∆2 contract.
13 By contrast, under
a ∆12 tariff, where the difference in the prices reflects the difference in costs,
the expert is indifferent between a) always selling the low quality, b) always
selling the high quality, and c) always selling the appropriate quality. She
is therefore prepared to randomize between those three policies. From these
observations it follows that for any perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of
our game there is a payoff-equivalent PBE in which the expert offers a menu
of equal-mark-up tariffs, one for each type of consumer, and under each of
those tariffs randomizes among policies according to three probabilities that
designate, respectively, the probability of providing only the low-quality good
(µ1 ≥ 0), the probability of offering only the high-quality good (µ2 ≥ 0) and
the probability of offering the appropriate quality (µ12 ≥ 0).14 Therefore,
the equilibrium behavior of the expert can, without loss of generality, be
characterized by a pair (∆(.), µ(.)), where µ(.) = (µ1(.), µ2(.), µ12(.)), and
(∆(τ), µ(τ)) is the tariff selected by the type τ consumer in equilibrium. Of
course, µ1(τ) +µ2(τ) +µ12(τ) = 1 for each τ. Thus, one of the µ-functions is
redundant. Below we will refer to contracts where µ12 = 1 as efficient-service
tariffs, to contracts where µ1 = 1 as underprovision tariffs, and to contracts
where µ2 = 1 as overprovision tariffs.
13We use the terms tariff, price-vector and contract interchangeably. For convenience
we will often denote not only a specific tariff but also the implied mark-up by ∆. That
is, the term ∆ will then stand for the mark-up on the quality that is provided under the
respective contract (∆ = max{p1 − c1, p2 − c2}).
14To see this, note that any tariff that contains a higher mark-up for the high quality
(∆2 = p2−c2 > p1−c1) is payoff-equivalent to an equal-mark-up tariff ∆12 with ∆12 = ∆2
and µ2 = 1, and that any tariff that has a higher mark-up for the low quality (p2 − c2 <
p1 − c1 = ∆1) is payoff-equivalent to an equal-mark-up tariff ∆12 with ∆12 = ∆1 and
µ1 = 1.
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3 No Price-Discrimination
We start by presenting a benchmark result for a setting in which the expert
cannot price-discriminate among consumers. Without price-discrimination,
the expert posts an efficient-service tariff, where the consumer receives ad-
vice and appropriate service. If the efficiency gain from serving the type
with the highest expected cost (the lowest valuation for sufficient quality) is
sufficiently high, all types are served. Otherwise, prices are such that some
consumers do not consult the expert even though serving them would be
efficient. This is nothing but the familiar monopoly-pricing inefficiency: The
monopolistic expert would like to appropriate as much of the net gain from
trade as possible but, because of heterogeneous consumers, she puts up with
the risk of losing some consumers in order to extract more surplus from the
remaining ones. We record the monopoly pricing result in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose the monopolistic expert cannot price-discriminate
among consumers. Then, in any PBE the expert offers an efficient-service
tariff, where the consumer receives advice and appropriate service (µ12 = 1).
If consumers differ only in the probability of needing the high-quality good, t,
then high-cost consumers decide to remain un-served provided
c2 − c1 > (v − c− c2)f(1). (4)
Otherwise all consumers are efficiently served.
If consumers differ only in their gross valuation for sufficient quality, vs,
then low-valuation consumers decide to remain un-served provided
1 > (v − s¯− c− c1 − t(c2 − c1))g(s). (5)
Otherwise all consumers are efficiently served.
4 One-Dimensional Price-Discrimination
For the rest of the paper we allow the expert to post more than one tariff.
In this section, we analyze the two one-dimensional cases assuming that
consumers differ either only in the probability of needing the high quality
or only in the valuation of sufficient quality, postponing the two-dimensional
case to the next section.
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4.1 Differences in the Expected Cost: Overprovision
Since consumers’ tastes differ, the monopolist could – in principle – offer a
specific tariff for each type of consumer, or at least different tariffs to different
consumer groups. However, in the absence of information about the type of a
consumer the expert must make sure that each consumer indeed chooses the
tariff designed for him and not the tariff designed for other consumers. This
puts self-selection constraints on the set of tariffs offered by the monopolistic
expert. Proposition 2 provides a full characterization of the equilibrium for
a setting where consumers differ in the expected cost of efficient service and
where the expert is allowed to post arbitrary many tariffs.
Proposition 2 Suppose that consumers differ in their probability of needing
the high-quality good, t, but have the same gross valuation for sufficient qual-
ity, vs = v. Further suppose that the expert can price-discriminate among
consumers (rather than being restricted to post a single tariff only). Then,
in any PBE, the expert posts two tariffs, an efficient-service tariff, where the
consumer receives advice and appropriate service (µ12 = 1), and an over-
provision tariff, where the consumer receives the high-quality good without
advice (µ2 = 1).
15 Both tariffs attract customers and in total all consumers
are served. Low-cost consumers are served under the former tariff while high-
cost consumers choose the latter.
The equilibrium described in Proposition 2 features several interesting de-
tails. A first important characteristic is that the expert finds it optimal to
use only two of the three pure types of contract – an efficient-service tariff,
where the consumer receives advice and appropriate service, and an over-
provision tariff, where the consumer receives the high quality good without
advice. The intuition for why consumers are never served under an underpro-
vision tariff is that such a contract would be especially attractive for the most
profitable market segment, a segment that would otherwise self-select into
the efficient-service contract. To attract the most profitable market segment
with an underprovision tariff, the mark-up on low quality in that contract
has to be lower than the mark-up under the efficient-service tariff because
consumer’s expected gross utility is lower under the former. Hence offering
15The menu may contain some redundant tariffs too, i.e., some tariffs that attract no
consumers.
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such a contract is less profitable to the expert and given that no customer
is lost by not offering this contract the expert will refrain from posting it.
Figure 2 displays the expected utility of a customer of type t under the three
pure forms of contract (with ∆12 > max{∆1,∆2} to guarantee that each of
the contracts attracts consumers). Customers with t < t1 would self-select
into the underprovision contract, if offered. By not offering it the expert
increases her expected profit. Regarding the efficient-service contract (with
µ12 = 1), observe that some customers would receive less than their out-
side option by choosing it (in the figure, this is the case for customers with
t > t12). These customers can be served by the overprovision tariff, which is
unattractive for the most profitable market segment. Hence, discrimination
using an efficient-service and an overprovision tariff is attractive to separate
customers with a high t (who do not suffer much from receiving the high
quality without advice) from those with a low t (who would suffer more from
always buying the high quality).
A second important observation is that the expert never has an incentive
to randomize between pure types of contracts. To grasp the intuition for
this result, first notice that the surplus that can be extracted from the most
profitable customer group is increasing in µ12. Thus, setting µ12 equal to 1
maximizes the profit that the expert can extract from that group. Secondly,
the mark-up is bounded from above by the incentive constraint that deters
the most profitable customers from using the overprovision tariff. More low-
cost consumers would switch to that contract if it would contain a positive
probability of efficient service. Thus, to make separation as profitable as
possible, the expert will set the probability µ12 in the overprovision tariff
equal to 0.
Another interesting feature of the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 2
is that all consumers are served under price-discrimination. This results
from the fact that all types receive the same utility under the overprovi-
sion contract regardless of their t. This means that the indirect utility is
flat under this contract implying the existence of a positive mass of types
whose surplus is fully extracted in equilibrium by the expert. In that case,
a small increase in the mark-up would lead to leaving this mass un-served,
which would cause a significant drop in the expert’s profit. Such disconti-
nuity is the driving force of the no-exclusion result. A similar no-exclusion
result is obtained, for example, by Severinov and Deneckere (2006) who have
customers with heterogeneous valuations and different abilities to hide the
13
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Figure 2: Type Dependent Expected Utilities under Differences in the Ex-
pected Cost.
private information of their willingness to pay. They show that a password
mechanism which screens for non-strategic customers can lead to a market
where all customers are served.
The mark-up in the efficient-service tariff posted under the conditions of
Proposition 2 is strictly higher than that in the tariff of Proposition 1. This
follows from the observation that without price-discrimination the expert’s
trade-off is between increasing the mark-up charged to served customers and
losing some types to the unprofitable segment of un-served customers, while
the trade-off here is between increasing the mark-up charged from customers
served under the more profitable efficient-service tariff and losing some types
to the segment of customers served under the less profitable overprovision
tariff. An immediate consequence is that some consumers who receive advice
and appropriate quality under the conditions of Proposition 1 necessarily
receive (with strictly positive probability) too high quality when the expert
can price-discriminate among consumers. If the expert serves all consumers
if price-discrimination is not permitted, then allowing discrimination unam-
biguously reduces welfare. On the other hand, when some consumers are ex-
cluded under the conditions of Proposition 1, then there is a trade-off between
increasing the number of served consumers and providing advice and appro-
priate quality to served customers. Overall efficiency might increase or de-
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crease with price-discrimination, depending on the shape of the distribution
function F (·), the valuation v, the sunk cost c and the cost-differential c2−c1.
As our next result shows, the mass of consumers that are efficiently served
under non-discrimination and inefficiently under discrimination increases in
the net valuation v − c and decreases in the cost differential c2 − c1. At the
same time, the mass of consumers not served under non-discrimination, but
served under discrimination decreases in the net valuation and increases in
the cost differential. Therefore, price-discrimination is ceteris paribus more
likely to be efficiency enhancing if consumers’ valuation of an efficient quality
is small and if the cost differential is large.
Proposition 3 Suppose that consumers differ in their probability of need-
ing the high-quality good, t, but have the same gross valuation for sufficient
quality, vs = v.
(i) If c2 − c1 ≤ (v − c − c2)f(1), then price-discrimination decreases the
mass of consumers who are served efficiently while leaving the mass of served
consumers unaffected. Thus, under this condition price-discrimination un-
ambiguously reduces welfare.
(ii) If c2 − c1 > (v − c − c2)f(1), then price-discrimination decreases the
mass of consumers who are served efficiently and increases the mass of con-
sumers who are served. Welfare may increase or decrease because of price-
discrimination depending on the parameters of the problem. Let 1 − F (tN)
stand for the mass of consumers that are not served under non-discrimination
and served under discrimination. Similarly, let F (tN)− F (tD) stand for the
mass of consumers that are efficiently served under non-discrimination and
inefficiently under discrimination. Then 1 − F (tN) increases in c and in c2
and decreases in v and in c1, while F (t
N) − F (tD) decreases in c and in c2
and increases in v and in c1.
The ambiguity of the effect of price-discrimination is illustrated by the fol-
lowing example.
Example 1 Suppose the distribution function F (.) is given by F (x) = x1/y
for y ≥ 1. Then tN = min{(v−c−c1)/[(y+1)(c2−c1)], 1} and tD = 1/(y+1).
If v = 25, c = 8, c1 = 1, c2 = 9, and y = 1, then statement (i) of the
proposition applies and the non-discriminating expert will serve all consumers
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under the efficient-service tariff ∆N = 8, µ12 = 1. If she is allowed to price-
discriminate, then she serves half of the population under the efficient-service
tariff ∆D12 = 12, µ12 = 1, and the other half under the overprovision tariff
∆D2 = 8, µ2 = 1.
16 In this situation welfare is lower under discrimination
because in the non-discrimination case all consumers are served efficiently,
whereas in the case of discrimination customers in the interval t ∈ (1/2, 1]
are potentially overprovided, that is, with probability (1 − t) they receive the
high-quality good although low quality quality would have been sufficient. If we
take v = 20 instead, then the parameters are such that statement (ii) of the
proposition applies. Now the non-discriminating expert serves 68,75% of the
consumers efficiently (tN = 11/16) and the rest remains un-served. Welfare
is higher under discrimination because the gain of customers not served under
non-discrimination outweighs the loss of consumers that are efficiently served
under non-discrimination and inefficiently under discrimination (those in
the interval (1/2, 11/16]). On the other hand, if v = 22.5 (implying that
we are again in part (ii) of the proposition), then the non-discriminating
expert serves 84.375% of the consumers efficiently (tN = 27/32) and the rest
remains un-served. Now welfare under non-discrimination is higher than that
under discrimination.
The welfare results provide important new insights for the credence goods
literature. Discrimination of customers based on the amount of advice offered
can be welfare improving as well as welfare deteriorating. This stands in
sharp contrast to existing results in the credence goods literature (see, for
example, Emons, 1997 and 2001 and Dulleck and Kerschbamer, 2009) arguing
that experts should be provided with incentives to invest in diagnosis to
prevent them from providing high quality without advice. The comparative
statics provided in Proposition 3 indicate the direction of research needed by
competition authorities to identify whether a certain type of discrimination
leads to a reduction of welfare or not. Even a restriction to consumer surplus
only does not provide a clear answer.
16That ∆N and ∆D2 are equal is due to the fact that all consumers are served under
non-discrimination. Whenever some customers remainun-served under non-discrimination,
mark-ups differ.
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4.2 Differences in the Valuation: Underprovision
Consider now the setting where consumers differ in their valuation for suffi-
cient quality, but have the same probability of needing the high-quality good.
Proposition 4 fully characterizes the equilibrium with price-discrimination for
this case.
Proposition 4 Suppose that consumers differ in their gross valuation for
sufficient quality, vs, but have the same probability of needing the high-quality
good, t > 0. Further suppose that the expert can price-discriminate among
consumers (rather than being restricted to post a single tariff only). Then,
if price-discrimination is observed in equilibrium, it is performed via a menu
containing two tariffs, an efficient-service tariff, where the consumer receives
advice and appropriate service (µ12 = 1), and an underprovision tariff, where
the consumer receives the low-quality good without advice (µ1 = 1). High-
valuation consumers are served under the former tariff while lower-valuation
consumers opt for the latter.
Proposition 4 tells us that in the model where consumers differ in their valu-
ation for a successful match, but have the same expected cost of efficient
service, price-discrimination may entail underprovision of quality to low-
valuation consumers. An explanation is easily provided. Since consumers are
homogeneous in the expected cost of efficient service, an overprovision tariff,
if attractive for low-valuation consumers, will also attract high-valuation ones
and hence cannot be used for discriminatory purposes, see Figure 3 for an
illustration. Given that customers accepting ∆2 would also accept ∆12 and
∆2 < ∆12 the former contract will not be offered. An underprovision tar-
iff, on the other hand, is unattractive for high-valuation consumers because
they have more to lose if the good fails to deliver while low-valuation cus-
tomers are willing to take the gamble given the lower mark-up. It is therefore
potentially, but not necessarily, useful for discrimination.
Regarding welfare consequences of price-discrimination the equivalent to
Proposition 3 now reads:
Proposition 5 Suppose that consumers differ in their gross valuation for
sufficient quality, vs, but have the same probability of needing the high-quality
17
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Figure 3: Type Dependent Expected Utilities under Difference in the Valu-
ation.
good, t > 0. Further suppose that price-discrimination is profitable under the
conditions of Proposition 4.
(i) If [v− s¯− c− c1− t(c2− c1)]g(s) ≥ 1, then price-discrimination decreases
the mass of consumers who are served efficiently while leaving the mass of
served consumers unaffected. Thus, under this condition price-discrimination
unambiguously reduces welfare.
(ii) If [v− s¯− c− c1− t(c2− c1)]g(s) < 1, then price-discrimination increases
the mass of consumers who are served and decreases the mass of consumers
who are served efficiently. Welfare may increase or decrease because of price-
discrimination depending on the parameters of the problem.
The following examples illustrates the result:
Example 2 Take the main parameters of Example 1 but assume now that t
is fixed at t = 1/2 while s is distributed according to the distribution function
G(s) = (s/s¯)1/y on [0, s¯] for y ≥ 1. Then sN = min{[ v−c−c1−t(c2−c1)]/(1+
y), s¯}, and, if price-discrimination is profitable, then sD12 = [v(1− x)− c2 +
c1]/[(1+y)(1−x)] and sD1 = min{[ v(1− t+ tx)−c−c1]/[(1+y)(1− t+ tx)],
s¯}. If v = 35, c = 8, c1 = 1, c2 = 9, x = 0.5, s¯ = 10 and y = 1, then
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statement (i) of the proposition applies and the non-discriminating expert
serves all consumers under the efficient-service tariff ∆N = 12, µa12 = 1.
If she is allowed to price-discriminate, then she serves 95% of the popula-
tion under the efficient-service tariff ∆D12 = 12.125, µ
b
12 = 1, and the rest of
customers under the underprovision tariff ∆D1 = 9.75, µ1 = 1. With these
parameter values welfare is lower under discrimination. The reason is that
under non-discrimination all consumers are served efficiently, whereas under
discrimination customers with an s in the interval [9.5, 10] are potentially
underprovided, that is, with probability t they receive the low-quality good al-
though high quality would have been necessary to generate consumer surplus.
If v is 30 instead, then the parameters are such that statement (ii) of the
proposition applies. Now the non-discriminating expert serves 85% of the
consumers efficiently (sN = 8.5) and the rest remains un-served. Welfare
is higher under discrimination because the gain of customers not served un-
der non-discrimination but served under discrimination (those in the interval
[8.5, 9]) outweighs the loss of consumers that are efficiently served under non-
discrimination and inefficiently under discrimination (those in the interval
[7, 8.5]). On the other hand, if v = 32.5 (implying that we are again in part
(ii) of the proposition), then the non-discriminating expert serves 97,5% of
the consumers efficiently and the rest remains un-served, while the discrim-
inating monopolist serves all consumers but only 82,5% of them efficiently.
In this case welfare is higher under non-discrimination.
Similar to the previous welfare result we observe that prohibiting price-
discrimination is not necessarily welfare enhancing. While discrimination
leads to tariffs that induce the expert to provide the low quality without
taking the customer’s actual condition into account, it may also lead to more
consumers being served. This insight is again new in the credence goods
literature. A standard solution to the credence good problem is the intro-
duction of a liability rule which rules out underprovision (see Dulleck and
Kerschbamer, 2006, for the theoretical argument and Dulleck et al., 2011, for
experimental evidence regarding the power of liability as a solution for the
credence goods problem). Introducing such a rule in the setting considered
her would have the same effect as ruling out price-discrimination which might
reduce welfare if fewer customers are served in equilibrium.
19
5 Two-Dimensional Price-Discrimination
In this section we discuss the framework where consumers differ in both,
the expected cost of efficient service and the valuation of sufficient quality.
Although this general setting does not allow for a complete characterization
of the tariffs used under price-discrimination, we are able to show that the
expert still finds it always optimal to serve some customers under an efficient-
service tariff. Moreover, our analysis indicates that if price-discrimination is
allowed, the expert may offer in equilibrium an elaborate menu of tariffs
which may include contracts with over- and underprovision of quality and,
possibly, contracts where she randomizes between different policies.
The main obstacle in analyzing the two-dimensional case is dealing with the
self-selection constraints. For screening problems that are one-dimensional
in both types and instruments, the difficulty is resolved for there is a partic-
ularly simple characterization of the set of implementable decision functions
µ.17 Specifically, in the presence of the single-crossing condition, µ is im-
plementable if and only if it is monotonic. This is no longer true when
consumers have multiple characteristics. In the multidimensional case, the
difficulty can sometimes be circumvented by characterizing the set of all im-
plementable indirect utilities – see Carlier (2001) for details. For example, if
utility is linear in types, an indirect utility function is implementable if and
only if it is convex. Unfortunately, such characterizations are known only for
very specific classes of utility functions. The general solution of the problem
is still out of reach – see Basov (2005) for a fairly detailed discussion and
Figalli et al. (2011) for some recent theoretical advances in the area.
The problem is especially difficult if a consumer’s utility is non-linear in types,
as it is in our model.18 Nevertheless, there are two results which we are able
to show for the general case. First, we show that in the absence of price-
discrimination the expert will post an efficient-service tariff, just as in the
two one-dimensional cases. Second, we show that once price-discrimination
17A decision function µ is implementable if it satisfies the self-selection constraints under
an appropriate set of tariffs.
18For the relaxed problem – where the incentive compatibility constraints are replaced by
the corresponding envelope theorem conditions of the consumer’s maximization problem
– we can show that the generic solution is to offer (at most) three deterministic contracts:
an efficient-service tariff, an underprovision tariff and an overprovision tariff. However, the
solution to the relaxed problem does not have to be a solution of the complete problem.
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is permitted and the menu of contracts offered by the expert is finite, there
is always a positive mass of consumers that is induced to choose an efficient-
service tariff. In deriving these two results, we assume that each consumer is
characterized by a pair (s, t) and that a consumer of type (s, t) has valuation
vs = v − s and needs high quality with probability t. Consumers’ types are
drawn independently from the same joint c.d.f. H (s, t), with strictly positive
density h (·) on [0, s¯]× (0, 1). H (·) is common knowledge, but a consumer’s
type is the consumer’s private information. As in the one-dimensional cases
we start with the non-discrimination result:
Proposition 6 Suppose that consumers differ in both dimensions, in their
probability of needing the high-quality good, t, and in their gross valuation
for sufficient quality, vs. Further suppose the monopolistic expert cannot
price-discriminate among consumers. Then, in any PBE the expert offers an
efficient-service tariff, where the consumer receives advice and appropriate
service (µ12 = 1). The prices in the contract are such that some consumers
decide to remain un-served (∆ > v − s¯− c− c2).
The intuition for the statement that the contract offered without price-
discrimination will always be an efficient-service tariff carries through the
cases with one-dimensional as well as two-dimensional heterogeneity. A key
difference to the one-dimensional case is that in the latter case some group
of strictly positive mass always remains inefficiently un-served. Such an ex-
clusion result is standard in the multidimensional screening literature – see
Armstrong (1996), for instance. It does not bear much economic significance,
however, but rather follows from the technical assumption that the distribu-
tion is non-atomic.19 If we assume instead that the distribution is discrete,
then no-exclusion becomes possible in the two-dimensional case as well, as
the example below shows.
Proposition 7 Suppose that consumers differ in both, in their probability
of needing the high-quality good, t, and in their gross valuation for suffi-
cient quality, vs. Further suppose that the monopolistic expert can price-
discriminate among consumers by offering a finite menu of tariffs. Then, in
19Specifically, in the two-dimensional case the analog of the density in conditions (4) and
(5) is a curvilinear integral of density along the boundary separating served and unserved
consumers. Since in the limit case such a boundary consists of a single point (s¯, 1), the
integral is zero, and the two-dimensional analog of conditions (4) and (5) is always satisfied.
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any PBE, there is always a positive mass of types who are attracted by an
efficient-service tariff.
While a full characterization of the equilibrium for the two-dimensional ver-
sion of our model is out of reach, the discrete version of the expert’s max-
imization problem can be readily solved numerically. This follows from the
observation that the consumer’s utility is linear in instrument variables µ.
Below we use a simple discrete example to highlight the differences between
the two one-dimensional cases on the one hand and the multidimensional
setting on the other. In the two-dimensional setting, it may be optimal for
the expert to offer more than two contracts, and sometimes it is optimal for
her to offer a random contract.20
Example 3 Suppose that each consumer is characterized by his two-dimensional
type (s, t) and that consumers’ types are independently drawn from an equal
probability distribution on the discrete support {(0.5, 0.5) , (2.2, 0.2) , (1.0, 0.9) ,
(2.2, 0.5)}. The parameter values are v = 5, c = c2 = 1, c1 = 0 and x = 0.
Case (i). If the expert can post a single tariff only, then she serves all con-
sumers under the efficient-service contract ∆N = 1.3. With this policy she
earns the expected profit of 1.3 per consumer.
Case (ii). If the expert can price-discriminate among consumers but her
choice is confined to the class of deterministic tariffs, then she can increase
her expected profit to approximately 1.435 per consumer by posting three
tariffs, the efficient-service contract ∆D12 = 2.5, µ12 = 1, the overprovi-
sion tariff ∆D2 = 2.0, µ2 = 1, and the underprovision tariff ∆
D
1 = 1.24,
µ1 = 1. In this case, (0.5, 0.5)-consumers receive advice and appropriate
quality, (1.0, 0.9)-consumers are induced to buy high quality without advice
under ∆D2 , (2.2, 0.2)-consumers are induced to buy low quality without advice
under ∆D1 , and (2.2, 0.5)-consumers remain un-served.
Case (iii). If the expert can price-discriminate without being confined to the
class of deterministic tariffs, it is still optimal for her to exclude type (2.2, 0.5)
and to induce types (0.5, 0.5) and (1.0, 0.9) to choose the same contracts as
in case (ii). However, type (2.2, 0.2) is now induced to take the random
20The solutions are found using the program Mathematica.
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contract ∆˜D1 = 1.37, µ1 = 0.65, µ2 = 0, which increases the expected profit of
the expert to about 1.47 per sonsumer.21
Why is randomization optimal in the settting considered in Example 3? In
case (ii), three constraints are binding in equilibrium: the participation con-
straints for types (1.0, 0.9) and (2.2, 0.2), and the incentive compatibility
constraint where type (1.0, 0.9) is ”almost envied” by type (0.5, 0.5). For
the contract intended for type (2.2, 0.2), an increase in µ12 accompanied by
a decrease (of equal size) in µ1 allows to increase the mark-up without vi-
olating the (binding) participation constraint for (2.2, 0.2). This is locally
profitable because the extra surplus extracted from type (2.2, 0.2) directly
increases the expert’s profit. The expert can proceed this way (i.e., increas-
ing µ12 at the cost of µ1) to the point where the random contract becomes
attractive for another type. Indeed, in case (iii) the random contract has the
property that type (2.2, 0.2) is ”almost envied” by type (0.5, 0.5); that is, in
equilibrium the incentive compatibility constraint preventing (0.5, 0.5) from
taking the contract designed for (2.2, 0.2) is binding. The example is robust
in the sense that small changes in the parameters of the model result only in
small changes in equilibrium tariffs.
Let us discuss the differences to the results for the two one-dimensional cases
in more detail. Suppose first that consumer heterogeneity is in t only. Then
one of the µ-instruments is redundant – this can be seen from the inequality
∂2u
∂µ1∂t
≤ 0. That is, if starting with a contract that features µ1 > 0 we
increase µ12 at the cost of µ1 then the utility of consumers served under the
contract increases. However, the utility increase is higher for the less than
for the more profitable types. It follows that if some type t – type tˆ, say
– is served in equilibrium under some contract with strictly positive µ1, the
contract can be replaced by the expert by one with µ1 = 0. This would
allow her to extract higher surplus from type tˆ, leaving this type indifferent
between the old and the new contract. Moreover, the expert’s profit will
increase since only less profitable types, who opt for contracts that feature
a lower mark-up than that intended for type tˆ may have an incentive to
switch to the new contract (with µ1 = 0). Thus, it follows that the expert
finds it optimal to use only contracts featuring µ1 = 0 to maximize her
profit. With only one instrument (represented by the probability µ12, say) it
is always optimal for her to use only two deterministic contracts: one with
21The numbers are rounded off.
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µ12 = 1 and µ2 = 0 to extract the highest possible surplus form the most
profitable segment of consumers, and the other with µ12 = 0 and µ2 = 1 to
make separation as profitable as possible. A way to see this is to recall the
well-known fact that in equilibrium all local upward incentive compatibility
constraints are binding together with the participation constraint of the least
profitable served type. In total, there are as many binding constraints as
served types in equilibrium. These binding constraints allow us to exclude
all ∆ variables from the expert’s maximization program and to reformulate
it as the problem of maximizing the linear function
∑
t α(t)µ12(t), where the
α coefficients depend on the parameters of the model but not on ∆ and µ.
The remaining constraints are the requirements that the function µ12(.) is
non-increasing and takes its values between 0 and 1. The generic solution
of this maximization problem is a vertex of the cube [0, 1]n, where n is the
number of types. Such a solution corresponds to a menu of deterministic
contracts. The fact that the contracts are deterministic together with the
uniqueness of the instrument imply that there will be only two contracts
offered by the expert – an efficient-service tariff (featuring µ12 = 1) and an
overtreatment contract (with µ2 = 1). The same logic holds for the case
where consumers differ only in s due to inequality ∂
2u
∂µ2∂s
≤ 0. Here the expert
never uses a contract with strictly positive probability µ2 but rather posts
two deterministic tariffs – an efficient-service tariff and an underprovision
tariff.
The situation changes dramatically if consumers differ in both dimensions.
Then the two inequalities ∂
2u
∂µi∂t
≤ 0 and ∂2u
∂µi∂s
≤ 0 never hold together for any
i ∈ {1, 2}. That is, neither of the instruments is redundant in this case. This
is also intuitively clear from the fact that both one-dimensional situations are
the limit cases of the general case. Also, it is no longer true that the number
of binding constraints is equal to the number of participating types. In the
example above, there are two binding incentive compatibility constraints for
the most profitable type (0.5, 0.5) and two binding participation constraints
for the other two served types (1.0, 0.9) and (2.2, 0.2). It follows, that the
solution of the maximization problem is not necessarily a vertex of the cube
but may correspond to a menu that includes at least one random contract.
Thus, the occurrence of a random contract in the two-dimensional model is
a consequence of the more sophisticated structure of the system of binding
self-selection constraints and not a non-generic consequence of the parameter
constellation used in constructing the example.
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It is also worth noting that separation is not always optimal in the two-
dimensional discrete case. If we change the distribution in Example 3 making
type (2.2, 0.5) more frequent, no exclusion and no discrimination become
optimal. With regard to welfare, we can only say that given that there
is no exclusion in the no-discrimination case – as in Example 3 – price-
discrimination necessarily reduces welfare. Examples of welfare-increasing
price-discrimination can also be constructed. In fact, as the variance in t
or s becomes small, the situation becomes similar to one of the two one-
dimensional cases, so the ambiguous effects of various parameters on welfare
are also present in the two-dimensional case.
6 Discussion
In this section we revisit some of the modeling assumptions and discuss
alternatives.
Positive Diagnosis Cost – Diagnosis Effort Verifiable
The model assumes that the expert can identify the appropriate quality with-
out incurring any cost. The justification for assuming zero diagnosis cost is
that, if the expert finds it profitable to refrain from giving advice to some
consumers when diagnosis costs are zero, then, a forteriori, she will do so
with positive diagnosis costs. So, in studying price-discrimination, there is
no loss of generality in this assumption. Here we verify that this intuition
is correct. With positive diagnosis costs it is clear that the expert might
wish to offer under- or overprovision tariffs if there are enough consumers
who should efficiently be served under such contracts. To exclude such triv-
ial cases we concentrate on parameter-constellations for which performing
a diagnosis and consuming the diagnosed quality of the good is the effi-
cient policy. This is the case if and only if the diagnosis cost d satisfies
d ≤ min{(1 − t)(c2 − c1), t[(1 − x)(v − s) − c2 + c1]}. For the setting where
consumers differ only in their probability of needing the high-quality good,
but receive the same gross valuation if the good does deliver this condition
is equivalent to t ∈ [t1(d), t2(d)], where t1(d) = d/[(1 − x)v − c2 + c1] and
t2(d) = [c2−c1−d]/(c2−c1).22 Intuitively, performing diagnosis and providing
22Here we assume that d < (c2 − c1)[v(1− x)− c2 + c1)/v(1− x) so that t1(d) < t2(d).
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the diagnosed quality is the efficient solution if the cost of diagnosis is suffi-
ciently low and if the likelihood of needing the high-quality good is neither
too close to zero nor too close to one. Concentrating on t values satisfying
those conditions the appendix contains a formal proposition (Proposition 8)
showing that our main results continue to hold for costly and verifiable diag-
nosis effort. In this case a (fair) diagnosis price (of p = d) can be imposed on
the customer for performing it.23 The case where diagnosis is not contractible
is discussed below.
Unobservable Diagnosis Effort
As argued in the previous paragraph, assuming a positive diagnosis cost
does not affect our results if diagnosis effort is observable. For the IT exam-
ple in the introduction positive and verifiable diagnosis effort seems to be a
plausible assumption. Employees of specialized retailers do have to investi-
gate what the right system for each consumer is. Since this information is
customer-specific, it seems natural to think that the expert has to acquire
that information at a cost. And since the diagnosis is performed in the pres-
ence of the consumer, it seems plausible to assume that he can assess whether
the agent of the specialized retailer invests time and effort to find out what he
needs or not, and whether the agent is competent or not. In other industries
it may be more difficult to assess whether diagnosis effort has been invested
or not.
What happens if diagnosis effort is not observable? If effort to make a costly
diagnosis is not contractible, the need to provide balanced incentives for
efficient service (i.e. equal-mark-ups for different qualities) does not provide
any incentives for the expert to invest effort in performing a diagnosis. One
could argue, that in reality an expert would feel guilty if she provides an
inappropriate quality to a consumer under a (µ12 = 1)-tariff (where she
implicitly promises to provide advice and appropriate quality), but not if
she provides an inappropriate quality under a (µ1 = 1)-, or a (µ2 = 1)-tariff
(where there is no such implicit promise). Introducing such a guilt disutility
could solve the expert’s moral hazard problem (providing diagnosis when
If this assumption is violated performing a diagnosis is inefficient for any t.
23In equilibrium the price of diagnosis is indeterminate, implying that this assumption
is without loss of generality: If the consumer is served under a ∆12 tariff then he pays
p2 = c2+ ∆12 + p for the high-quality and p1 = c1+ ∆12 + p for the low-quality good,
thus, setting p = d is among the feasible solutions.
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diagnosis effort is not contractible), however, it would also affect other details
of the analysis.24 If the guilt cost is sufficiently high, then the expert can
commit to a (µ12 = 1)-policy even under price vectors that differ significantly
from equal-mark-up tariffs. In the limit she can even charge a constant
price for both qualities and still recommend and provide the appropriate
quality. If this is the case and if consumers differ in t only, then the expert
can extract all the surplus (even without price-discrimination) simply by
charging p1 = p2 = v − c. In the model where consumers differ in s but have
the same t no such simple solution exists. As in Subsection 4.2, profitable
price-discrimination would be performed via a menu containing an efficien-
service tariff and an underprovision tariff, the only difference being, that
there is now more flexibility in the price-list of the efficient-service tariff.
However, that flexibility would have no effect at all on our main results. For
the two-dimensional case an implication of our arguments is that with a high
guilt cost (or a largeimpact of reputation effects) only two types of contracts
are observed in equilibrium, an efficient-service tariff with a higher constant
price and an underprovision tariff with a lower constant price.
Verifiability of Success
Our model assumes that failure is observable but not verifiable. This means
that payments cannot be conditioned on success. An alternative would be
to assume that failure is verifiable such that payments and post-sale services
can be conditioned on success. Under this assumption experts can credi-
bly commit to perform diagnosis and to recommend the appropriate quality
even if diagnosis effort is both costly and unobservable and even if there is
neither a guilt cost nor a reputation to be lost. This can be done by an
appropriate design of mark ups and warranty payments.25 To see this denote
– as before – the diagnosis cost by d and the cost of post-sale services and
transfers by w (for warranty). To make sure that the expert invests effort
in diagnosis and recommends the appropriate quality, p1, p2 and w need to
satisfy w ≥ c2 − c1 − (p2 − p1) + d/t and p2 − p1 ≤ c2 − c1 − d/(1 − t) for
all t ∈ [t1(d), t2(d)]. The first of these conditions ensures that not performing
24Beck et al. (2013) formally investigate the impact of psychological guilt aversion
on expert behavior in a credence goods market. An alternative to introducing a guilt
disutility is to postulate reputation effects. The effect on the main results are similar to
those discussed in the main text.
25Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2009) show this for a competitive environment.
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diagnosis and blindly recommending c1 is dominated by performing diag-
nosis and recommending the appropriate quality, while the second ensures
that not performing diagnosis and blindly recommending c2 is dominated.
For parameter constellations for which performing diagnosis is the efficient
policy, the RHS of the second condition is strictly positive implying that
charging a constant price for both qualities is among the feasible solutions.
Thus, the effect of introducing both, costly and unverifiable diagnosis effort
and verifiability of success is similar to that of introducing both costly and
unverifiable diagnosis effort and a sufficiently high guilt cost. In both cases
price-discrimination in the t dimension disappears while price-discrimination
in the s dimension remains profitable.
Unobservable Quality Cost
Our model also assumes that the costs to the expert of providing c1 and c2
are perfectly known to consumers. This assumption is important as it allows
the use of equal-mark-up prices to convince the customer that the expert
has no material incentive to recommend the wrong quality. Referring back
to the example form the introduction, for today’s IT industry, the assump-
tion seems to be vaguely plausible as prices for the components, hardware
and software are publicly available. In the earlier days, as well as for other
industries, this definitely is a strong assumption. The effect of relaxing it is
that the consumer can no longer perfectly infer the expert’s incentives from
posted prices. This leads to similar complications as introducing unobserv-
able diagnosis effort. Again, a possible remedy is to introduce a disutility
to the expert from an inefficient match, to impute reputation effects, or to
assume verifiability of success. In the latter case, the expert can choose
warranty payments and mark-ups in such a way that performing a costly
diagnosis and recommending the appropriate quality is the most profitable
strategy even for the most extreme cost realizations. That is, if from con-
sumers’ perspective c1 is distributed according to some distribution function
with strictly positive density on [c1, c¯1], while c2 is distributed on [c2, c¯2],
then a tariff structure satisfying w ≥ c¯2− c1 − (p2 − p1) + d/t and p2 − p1 ≤
c
¯
2 − c¯1 − d/(1 − t) for all t ∈ [t1(d), t2(d)] is needed to provide appropriate
incentives. Under the assumption that performing a diagnosis is the efficient
policy for all cost realizations, setting p1 = p2 and w ≥ c¯2 − c1 + d/t1(d) will
do the task.
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Consumers’ Sunk Cost
The basic model of Section 2 assumes that each consumer incurs a sunk cost
c ≥ (1 − t)(c2 − c1) if he visits the expert independently of whether he is
actually served or not.26 This assumption has the effect that a consumer’s
option to reject a recommended quality doesn’t impose a binding constraint
on the expert’s maximization problem. To see this, consider the model of
Subsection 4.1 and suppose that the ex post participation constraint is not
binding. Then, the maximal profit the expert can realize from serving a type
t consumer with an efficient-service tariff is v− c− c1− t(c2− c1) (otherwise
the consumer would refrain from visiting the expert) while equal mark-up
prices require p2 − c2 = p1 − c1. Thus, p2 = c2 + v − c − c1 − t(c2 − c1) =
v−c+(1− t)(c2−c1). Now, it follows from c ≥ (1− t)(c2−c1) that p2 < v, so
that the ex post participation constraint is indeed not binding. If we allowed
for c < (1− t)(c2−c1) then there could be parameter constellations for which
the restriction p2 ≤ v becomes binding. In this case, the largest surplus that
could be extracted with an efficient-service tariff would be (1 − t)[v − (c2 −
c1)] + tv leading to a profit of (1− t)[v − (c2 − c1)− c1] + t(v − c2) = v − c2.
This profit is larger than the profit attainable with an overprovision tariff
(which is v − c− c2) whenever c > 0. Thus, allowing for c < (1− t)(c2 − c1)
(or c < c2−c1, respectively) would complicate the analysis without providing
different results (provided c > 0).
An Alternative Interpretation of the Model
In the model a monopolistic expert price-discriminates among consumers via
a menu of tariffs. Here, we re-interpret this scenario and the results we
obtained in terms of a manufacturer with market power who uses different
distribution channels as an instrument of price-discrimination. A simple re-
interpretation of the results of the first model we considered – where the
expert posts an efficient-service tariff to skim-off low-cost consumers and an
overprovision tariff to serve the rest – is that the monopolistic manufacturer
sets up two types of stores, specialist outlets through which she distributes
the entire quality spectrum and where the qualifications and incentives of the
sales personnel are such that they diagnose customers’ needs and suggest the
appropriate equipment; and discount outlets through which she distributes
26In Subsection 4.1 and Section 5, where t is assumed to be distributed on [0, 1] , the
relevant condition is c ≥ c2 − c1.
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only the high-quality good. This story is not very realistic, however. A more
elaborate model would have a monopolistic manufacturer that distributes
her products through a competitive retail stage. The simplest version of
such a model would have two types of retailers, expert shops with highly
qualified sales personnel and discounters. Suppose that there are at least
two retailers of each of these two types in the market. Further suppose that
the manufacturer’s products are only a small part of a much larger number
of products handled by a typical retailer so that the manufacturer can treat
the characteristics of the retail stage as given.27 Then the manufacturer
can mimic the single-expert behavior by the choice of different distribution
channels. To see this, suppose that the manufacturer wants to skim-off low-
cost consumers via an efficient-service tariff featuring p1 = c1 + ∆12 and
p2 = c2 + ∆12 and serve the rest of the market with an overprovision tariff
with p1 < c1 + ∆2 and p2 = c2 + ∆02. How can she do this? She offers
the two qualities at wholesale prices we1 = c1 + ∆12 and w
e
2 = c2 + ∆12 to
at least two expert shops and she offers only the high-quality good at the
wholesale price wd2 = c2 + ∆2 to at least two discounters. With at least two
discounters carrying the high-quality good, market equilibrium yields pd2 =
wd2 by the usual price-undercutting argument. And expert retailers? Would
an expert post prices violating the equal-mark-up rule, consumers would
become suspicious; they would correctly infer that the expert will either
always recommend the high-quality good (if pe1 − we1 < pe2 − we2), or always
recommend the low-quality good (if pe1−we1 > pe2−we2), and they would adjust
their willingness to pay accordingly. So, experts cannot gain from posting
prices violating the equal-mark-up rule. In equilibrium, at least two experts
will post efficient-service tariffs. With tariffs that induce efficient service,
Bertrand competition again yields prices such that underbidding yields losses
and charging more implies a loss of customers; that is, pe1−we1 = pe2−we2 = 0.
Note that here again the sunk cost c plays an important role in making the
story consistent: For small enough c (c < pe2−pd2) experts would become vul-
nerable to competition with discounters. Why? Because discounters would
then be able to attract consumers who have learned from an expert that
they need a high-quality good. To avoid this, the manufacturer would have
to reduce we2 accordingly. The rest of the story is the same as in the ba-
sic model: The profitability of price-discrimination would be reduced but
price-discrimination would remain profitable as long as c > 0.
27Marvel and McCafferty (1984) make a similar assumption in a different context.
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7 Concluding Remarks
Research on credence goods markets typically assumes that consumers are
homogeneous. The present article has studied the consequences of allowing
for heterogeneous consumers in a model where an expert (or a manufacturer)
has some degree of market power. With heterogeneous consumers and market
power, price-discrimination may emerge in equilibrium. We have shown, that
in the case of experts markets, price-discrimination regards the amount of
advice offered. The whole spectrum of qualities and advice on which quality
fits the customer’s needs best is sold to the most profitable market segment
only. Less profitable consumers are induced to demand a given quality with-
out receiving any advice. If consumers differ in the expected cost of efficient
service, then low-cost consumers receive advice and efficient service, while
high-cost consumers are potentially overprovided ; that is, they are induced to
demand high-quality equipment without receiving advice. By contrast, under
heterogeneity in the valuation of sufficient quality high-valuation consumers
receive advice and efficient service, while low-valuation ones are potentially
underprovided ; that is, they are induced to demand low-quality equipment
independently of their actual needs.
While the equilibrium behavior outlined in the present paper is obviously an
abstraction and it is probably impossible to point out an industry that fea-
tures exactly this kind of price-discrimination, our results identify an element
that may be present in the conduct of many credence goods markets. We
discussed the evolution of the IT industry as an example in the introduction.
Other credence goods markets with similar characteristics – large heterogene-
ity in consumers’ valuation for a successful match in the beginning; large
heterogeneity in the product quality with product maturation – featured a
similar evolution. Examples are fitness equipment, as for instance, tread-
mills. At the beginning advanced machines where only available through
specialized stores that also offered advice in choosing the right equipment,
whereas simpler equipment was sold at warehouse outlets. Nowadays, ad-
vanced equipment is available from discounters. Similarly, better makes of
digital cameras were first sold by expert stores only, whereas now also dis-
count outlets offer advanced digital photo equipment. Digital hearing aids,
stereo equipment, functional sports ware and even eyeglasses experienced a
similar history.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Suppose that customers differ only in their prob-
ability t. Under the conditions of Proposition 1,
(∆(t), µ1(t), µ2(t), µ12(t)) = (∆, µ1, µ2, µ12)
for all t. We now show in the first step that µ1 = µ2 = 0 implying that the
expert indeed posts an efficient-service tariff. To see that µ1 = 0, suppose
to the contrary that µ1 > 0. Then the expert’s profit is strictly increased by
replacing the original tariff (∆, µ1, µ2, µ12) by the tariff (∆ˆ, µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ12), where
∆ˆ = ∆ + tˆµ1[v(1−x)− c2 + c1], µˆ1 = 0, µˆ2 = µ2, µˆ12 = µ1 +µ12, and where tˆ
is the highest type that is served in equilibrium (if all types are served then
tˆ = 1). By construction type tˆ is indifferent between the old and the new
tariff, therefore he will still buy in equilibrium. Types t < tˆ are worse off
under the new contract. However, since consumers’ utility under the new
contract – which is given by u(t, ∆ˆ, µˆ) = v− c− c2− ∆ˆ + (1− t)µˆ12(c2− c1) –
is decreasing in t and since tˆ is willing to buy, those types are willing to buy
too. Thus, since ∆ˆ > ∆ and since at least the same mass of types is served
as before, the replacement has increased the expert’s profit, contradicting
the optimality of the original contract. The argument for µ2 = 0 is similar.
Thus, µ12 = 1 and type t’s expected utility under the contract is u(t,∆, µ) =
v− c− c1− t(c2− c1)−∆. The expert maximizes [v− c− c1− tˆ(c2− c1)]F (tˆ),
where the maximum is taken in tˆ. As is easily verified, this problem yields an
interior solution under the condition stated in the proposition and a corner
solution otherwise.
The arguments for the case when consumers differ only in the gross valuation
are similar with the replacement of condition (4) for (5). As before, it can
be shown that the non-discriminating tariff (∆, µ1, µ2, µ12) has µ1 = µ2 = 0
implying that type s′s utility under the tariff is u(s,∆, µ) = v− s− c− c1 −
t(c2− c1)−∆. The expert maximizes [v− sˆ− c− c1− t(c2− c1)]G(sˆ), where
the maximum is taken in sˆ, implying the result.
Proof of Proposition 2. Given the selected tariff (∆, µ) type t’s expected
utility can be written down as
u(t,∆, µ) = v− c− c2−∆ + (1− t)[µ12 +µ1](c2− c1)− tµ1[v(1−x)− c2 + c1].
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Denote by M the menu of tariffs offered by the expert, then type t’s expected
utility in equilibrium (type t’s surplus) is
U(t) = max
(∆,µ)∈M
u(t,∆, µ).
Let (∆(t), µ(t)) ∈ M be the contract chosen by type t. We follow the
standard procedure introduced by Mirrlees (1971). The expert maximizes∫ tˆ
0
∆(t)dF (t), which is equivalent to maximizing
∫ tˆ
0
(v − c− c2 + (1− t)[µ12(t) + µ1(t)](c2 − c1)− tµ1(t)[v(1− x)− c2 + c1]) dF (t)−∫ tˆ
0
U(t)dF (t)
in tˆ, µ12(t), and µ1(t). The second integral can be transformed using the
equality
∫
U(t)dF (t) = U(t)F (t) − ∫ F (t)dU(t). By the envelop theorem,
U ′(t) = ∂u(t,∆, µ)/∂t, so
dU = −(µ12(t)(c2 − c1) + µ1(t)v(1− x))dt.
Furthermore,
∫ tˆ
0
U(t)dF (t) = U(tˆ)F (tˆ)− U(0)F (0)− ∫ tˆ
0
F (t)dU(t) =
U(tˆ)F (tˆ) +
∫ tˆ
0
(
µ12(t)(c2 − c1) + µ1(t)(v(1− x))
)
F (t)dt.
Thus, taking into account U(tˆ) = 0,
∫ tˆ
0
∆(t)dF (t) =
∫ tˆ
0
(
µ12(t)Φ12(t) + µ1(t)Φ1(t)
)
dt+ (v − c− c2)tˆ,
where Φ12(t) = (c2−c1)((1−t)f(t)−F (t)), Φ1(t) = (c2−c1−tv(1−x))f(t)−
v(1 − x)F (t). Since Φ12(t) > Φ1(t), it is never optimal for the expert to
have µ1(t) > 0. Therefore, µ1(t) = 0 for all t. Since F (t) is log-concave
and f(t) > 0 for all t it follows that (1 − t)f(t) − F (t) takes both positive
and negative values and ((1− t)f(t)− F (t))/F (t) is strictly decreasing in t.
Therefore, there is a unique t12 such that (1 − t)f(t) − F (t) is positive for
t < t12 and negative for t > t12. This implies that the expert optimally offers
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two tariffs: a tariff with an honest recommendation (µ12(t) = 1) and a tariff
under which the consumer is overprovided with probability one (µ12(t) = 0).
All consumers of type t < t12 select the former tariff while all consumers of
type t > t12 are systematically overprovided. Moreover, the expert’s profit
is increasing in tˆ, therefore it is optimal to have tˆ = 1. Integrating the
expression for dU one obtains
U(t) =
{
(c2 − c1)(t12 − t), t ≤ t12,
0, t > t12.
The corresponding equilibrium mark-ups are equal then to
∆(t) =
{
v − c− c1 − t12(c2 − c1), t ≤ t12,
v − c− c2, t > t12.
One can easily see that the solution satisfies the incentive compatibility con-
straints.
Proof of Proposition 3. Statement (i) of the proposition follows from
the discussion above. To prove the rest, notice that tN satisfies the first order
condition of the expert’s maximization problem (v−c−c1
c2−c1 −tN)
f(tN )
F (tN )
= 1, while
the highest type efficiently served under discrimination tD without loss of
generality satisfies (1− tD) f(tD)
F (tD)
= 1. Since v−c−c1
c2−c1 > 1 and f/F is decreasing,
it should be tN > tD. Moreover, tN increases in v and in c1, and decreases
in c and in c2, while t
N depends only on F (.) and not on v, c, c1 and c2.
Thus, 1− F (tN) increases in c and in c2 and decreases in v and in c1, while
F (tN)− F (tD) decreases in c and in c2 and increases in v and in c1.
Proof of Proposition 4. Given the selected tariff (∆, µ) type s’s expected
utility can be written down as
u(s,∆, µ) = v−s−c−c1−∆−[1−µ12−µ2]t(1−x)(v−s)−[tµ12+µ2](c2−c1).
Let M be the menu of tariffs offered by the expert and (∆(s), µ(s)) ∈M be
the contract chosen by type s in equilibrium. Then the consumer s’s surplus
is
U(s) = u(s,∆(s), µ(s)) = max
(∆,µ)∈M
u(s,∆, µ).
The expert maximizes
∫ S
0
∆(s)dG(s), where the maximum is taken in S,∆(s),
µ12(s), and µ2(s). This is equivalent to maximizing
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∫ S
0
{[1− t(1− x)(1− µ12(s)− µ2(s))](v − s)− c− c1 − [tµ12(s) + µ2(s)](c2 −
c1)}dG(s)−
∫ S
0
U(s)dG(s).
As before, the second integral can be transformed using the equality
∫
U(s)dG(s)
= U(s)G(s) − ∫ G(s)dU(s). From the envelop condition, dU = −[1 − t(1 −
x)(1− µ12(s)− µ2(s))]ds. Furthermore,
∫ S
0
U(s)dG(s) = U(S)G(S)− U(0)G(0)− ∫ S
0
G(s)dU(s) =
U(S)G(S) + (1− t+ tx) ∫ S
0
G(s)ds+
∫ S
0
t(1− x)(µ12(s) + µ2(s))G(s)ds.
And, taking into account U(S) = 0,
∫ S
0
∆(s)dG(s) =
∫ S
0
[(1− t+ tx)(v − s)− c− c1]dG(s)− (1− t+
tx)
∫ S
0
G(s)ds+
∫ S
0
(
µ12(s)Ψ12(s) + µ2(s)Ψ2(s)
)
ds,
where Ψ12(s) = [t(1− x)(v− s)− t(c2− c1)]g(s)− t(1− x)G(s) and Ψ2(s) =
[t(1−x)(v−s)−(c2−c1)]g(s)−t(1−x)G(s). Since Ψ12(s) > Ψ1(s) for t > 0, it
should be µ2(s) = 0 for the optimal µ. Note that the function Ψ12(s)/g(s) is
strictly decreasing and strictly positive at zero. This means that there exists
s12 such that Ψ12(s) is positive for s < s12 and negative (or not defined) for
s > s12. Thus, for any S the optimal µ12(s) is equal to 1 up to s12 and zero
afterwards. (The case µ12(s) = 1 for all s is also possible). Such s12 does
not depend on the optimal S. The equilibrium utility of consumer s is given
then by
U(s) =
{
S − s− t(1− x)(S − s12), s ≤ s12,
S − s− t(1− x)(S − s), s12 < s ≤ S,
and the corresponding mark-ups are
∆(s) =
{
v − S − c− c1 − t(c2 − c1) + t(1− x)(S − s12), s ≤ s12,
v − S − c− c1 − t(1− x)(v − S), s12 < s ≤ S.
Again, the incentive compatibility constraints are easily verified.
Proof of Proposition 5. The non-discriminating monopolist maximizes
pi(s) = [v − c − c1 − t(c2 + c1) − s] G(s) s.t. s ∈ [0, s¯], where the maximum
is taken in s. The solution to this problem, sN , satisfies either v − c − c1 −
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t(c2 − c1) = sN + G(sN)/g(sN) (if [v − s¯ − c − c1 − t(c2 − c1)]g(s) ≤ 1), or
sN = s¯ (otherwise). If price-discrimination is profitable under the conditions
of Proposition 4, then the expert’s maximization problem
max
s12,s1∈[0,s¯]
t[(1−x)(v−s12)− c2 + c1]G(s12)+ [(1− t+ tx)(v−s1)− c− c1]G(s1)
yields a solution (sD12, s
D
1 ) that satisfies (a) s
D
12 < s
D
1 ≤ s¯; (b) v − (c2 −
c1)/(1− x) = sD12 +G(sD12)/g(sD12); and (c) either v− (c+ c1)/[1− t(1− x)] =
sD1 + G(s
D
1 )/g(s
D
1 )] (if v − s¯ − (c + c1)/[1 − t(1 − x)] ≤ 1/g(s¯)), or sD1 = s¯
(otherwise). Conditions (a), (b) and (c) together imply
x ≥ c+ c1 − (1− t)(c2 − c1)
c+ c1 + t(c2 − c1)
as a necessary condition for price-discrimination to be profitable. Combining
this with the conditions that define sN (taking into account that s+G(s)/g(s)
is a strictly increasing function) yields sD12 < s
N ≤ sD1 , where the last inequal-
ity is strict for sN < s¯. This proves statement (i) and the first sentence of
statement (ii). The second sentence of statement (ii) is proven by means
of an example in the end of Subsection 4.2. Furthermore, observe that the
above optimality conditions imply that sN is increasing in v, decreasing in
c, c1, c2 and t, and constant in x; that s
D
12 is increasing in v and c1, decreasing
in c2 and x, and constant in c and t; and that s
D
1 is increasing in v and x,
decreasing in c, c1 and t, and constant in c2. Here we can only conclude that
the influence of these parameters on welfare is ambiguous.
Proof of Proposition 6. First, let us show that µ1 = µ2 = 0. Given
the non-discriminating tariff (∆, µ1, µ2, µ12) type (s, t)’s expected utility is
u(s, t,∆, µ) = v − s− c− c1 − t(c2 − c1)−∆− µ1t[(v − s)(1− x) + c1 − c2]
−µ2(1− t)(c2 − c1) = [1− tµ1(1− x)](v − s)− c− c1 −∆− [µ2 + t(1− µ1 −
µ2)](c2−c1). We can derive the set of consumers who are indifferent between
being served and not being served by solving the equation u(s, t,∆, µ) = 0
in s. For any t ∈ [0, 1] the indifferent consumer is of type
s˜(t) = v − c+ c1 + ∆ + (µ2 + t(1− µ1 − µ2))(c2 − c1)
1− tµ1(1− x) .
Observe that s˜(t) is a non-increasing function, and that it is strictly decreas-
ing for µ2 6= 1 (since µ2 = 1 implies µ1 = 0). Now, suppose that µ2 > 0. Then
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the expert’s profit can be strictly increased by replacing the original tariff
(∆, µ1, µ2, µ12) by the tariff (∆ˆ, µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ12) with ∆ˆ = ∆ + µ2(1− tˆ)(c2 − c1),
µˆ1 = µ1, µˆ2 = 0, µˆ12 = µ2 + µ12, where tˆ = 1 if s˜(1) > 0 and tˆ is de-
fined by condition s˜(tˆ) = 0 otherwise.28 By construction, type (s˜(tˆ), tˆ) is
indifferent between the old and the new tariff, therefore he still will buy in
equilibrium. Also, by construction, ∆ˆ ≥ ∆, so the new tariff yields greater
profit per consumer than the old one. Finally, the function s˜(t) for the new
tariff (∆ˆ, µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ12) is steeper (and therefore above that for the old tariff
for each t < tˆ) implying that more consumers are served. Thus, the profit
under the new tariff is higher than that under the old one, contradicting
the optimality of the latter. Consequently, µ2 = 0 and µ1 + µ12 = 1. Next,
suppose that µ1 > 0. Then the expert’s profit can be strictly increased by
replacing the original tariff (∆, µ1, µ2, µ12) by the tariff (∆ˆ, µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ12) with
∆ˆ = ∆ + tˆµ1[(v − s˜(tˆ))(1 − x) − c2 + c1], µˆ1 = 0, µˆ2 = µ2, µˆ12 = µ1 + µ12,
where tˆ = 0 if s˜(0) < s¯ and tˆ is defined by condition s˜(tˆ) = s¯ otherwise.
By construction, type (s˜(tˆ), tˆ) is indifferent between the old and the new
tariff and he will therefore still be willing to buy in equilibrium. Again, by
construction ∆ˆ ≥ ∆, so that the new tariff yields greater profit per con-
sumer than the old one. The function s˜(t) for the new tariff (∆ˆ, µˆ1, µˆ2, µˆ12)
is flatter and therefore above that for the old tariff for each t > tˆ imply-
ing that more consumers are served. Thus, the profit under the new tariff
is higher than that under the old one, contradicting the optimality of the
latter. Consequently, µ1 = 0, which together with µ2 = 0, yields µ12 = 1.
Under the non-discriminating tariff (∆, µ1 = 0, µ2 = 0, µ12 = 1) type (s, t)’s
expected utility is u(s, t,∆, µ) = v − s − c − c1 − t(c2 − c1) − ∆, s˜(t) is
given by v − c − c1 − t(c2 − c1) − ∆ and the aggregate demand is given
by
∫ 1
0
∫ s˜(t)
0
h(s, t)ds : dt. The non-discriminating monopolist maximizes the
product of ∆ and the aggregate demand. This maximization problem is
equivalent to the following one
max
t˜
Π(t˜) =
(
v − s− c− c1 − t˜(c2 − c1)
)( 1∫
0
s−(t−t˜)(c2−c1)∫
0
h(s, t)ds : dt
)
,
where t˜ is the solution of s˜(t) = s.29 Taking the derivative of this function
28For obvious reasons s˜(1) > s¯ is incompatible with profit maximization.
29That is, t˜ = (v − s− c− c1 −∆)/(c2 − c1).
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with respect to t˜ yields
Π′(t˜) = −(c2 − c1)
( 1∫
0
s−(t−t˜)(c2−c1)∫
0
h(s, t)ds : dt
)
+
(
v − s− c− c1 − t˜(c2 − c1)
) 1∫
0
(c2 − c1)h(s− (t− t˜)(c2 − c1), t)dt.
If t˜ = 1, then the first component of this sum is strictly negative and the
second component is zero. This proves that it is always optimal for the
expert to leave some customers un-served. The optimal non-discriminating
tariff has then prices such that ∆ > v − s− c− c2.
Proof Proposition 7. Suppose there is no µ12 = 1 tariff which attracts
a strictly positive measure of types. Then, among the tariffs chosen by a
strictly positive measure of types, take one with the highest ∆ and denote
it by (∆h, µh). Suppose µh2 > 0. The set of types attracted by each contract
is compact by the maximum theorem. Denote the type with the highest t
among the types attracted by (∆h, µh) by (sh, th) (if (sh, th) is not unique,
take an arbitrary one) and replace (∆h, µh) by (∆ˆ, µˆ) such that ∆ˆ = ∆h +
µh2(1 − th)(c2 − c1), µˆ1 = µh1 , µˆ2 = 0, µˆ12 = µh2 + µh12. By construction,
types with t = th are indifferent between the old and the new tariff and will
therefore opt for the latter if the former is no longer available. For types with
a lower t the new tariff is strictly more attractive than the old one implying
that all types attracted by (∆h, µh) under the original menu will be attracted
by (∆ˆ, µˆ) under the new menu. Types not attracted by (∆h, µh) under the
original menu will either switch to (∆ˆ, µˆ) or will choose the same tariff as
before the replacement. Thus, since ∆ˆ > ∆h, the new menu yields a higher
profit. Now suppose that µh2 = 0, µ
h
1 > 0. Then, by a similar argument,
the monopolist’s profit is increased by replacing (∆h, µh) by (∆˜, µ˜), where
∆˜ = ∆h + tlµ
h
1((v− sl)(1− x)− c2 + c1), µ˜1 = 0, µ˜2 = 0, µ˜12 = 1, and where
(sl, tl) minimizes the function tµ
h
1((v − s)(1− x)− c2 + c1) among the types
attracted by (∆h, µh).
Proposition 8 Suppose that performing a diagnosis involves a cost d and
that diagnosis effort is verifiable so that a (fair) diagnosis price (of p = d)
can be imposed on the customer for performing it.
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(i) Consider the model where consumers differ in their probability t of needing
the high-quality good while they receive the same gross utility vs = v if the
good does deliver. Suppose that consumers’ types are drawn independently
from the same log-concave c.d.f. F (·), with strictly positive density f (·) on
[t
¯
, t¯], where t
¯
≥ t1(d) and t¯ ≤ t2(d). Then, if price-discrimination is observed
in equilibrium, it is performed via a menu containing two tariffs, a tariff with
an honest recommendation (µ12 = 1) and a tariff in which the consumer is
overprovided with probability one (µ2 = 1). Low cost consumers are served
under the former tariff while high cost consumers choose the latter.
(ii) Consider the model where consumers differ in their gross valuation vs =
v − s while they have the same probability t of needing the high-quality good.
Suppose that consumers’ types are drawn independently from the same log-
concave c.d.f. G (·), with strictly positive density g (·) on [0, s¯], where s¯ < v−
c−c2. Further suppose that d ≤ min{(1−t)(c2−c1), t[(1−x)(v− s¯)−c2 +c1]}.
Then, if price-discrimination is observed in equilibrium, it is performed via a
menu containing two tariffs, a tariff with an honest recommendation (µ12 =
1) and a tariff in which the consumer is underprovided with probability one
(µ1 = 1). High valuation consumers are served under the former tariff while
lower valuation consumers opt for the latter.
Proof of Proposition 8. Here we prove part (i) of the proposition, the
proof for part (ii) is similar. Using the same techniques as in the proof of
Proposition 2 it can be shown that price-discrimination is profitable if and
only if t¯ is not too small (so that overprovision is not too inefficient — the
relevant condition is 1 < t¯+1/f(t¯) — and that profitable price-discrimination
involves serving the segment [t, t12] with tariff ∆12 = v− c− d− c1− t12(c2−
c1), µ12 = 1 and the segment (t12, t¯] with tariff ∆2 = v− c− c2, µ2 = 1, where
t12 solves (1− t12)f(t12) = F (t12).
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